Economic history : Monetary policy in the Confederacy by Eric Nielsen
Opportunity Cost
W
ars may be won or lost on
the battlefield, but gener-
alship, bravery, and
organization are of little use to an
army if its government can’t pay its
expenses. The ability of a government
to finance a war is often critical to the
war’s outcome, even if the effects of
financing seem far removed from mili-
tary action. In turn, a government’s
voracious appetite for resources to
fund its military and the peculiar
strain on production that characterize
times of war further complicate good
monetary and fiscal policymaking.
These tensions clearly played a signifi-
cant role in the conduct of the
American Civil War.
The need for wartime funding in the
North and South led to policies that
illustrate basic tenets of monetary
economics while precipitating a dra-
matic restructuring of the national
financial system, changes that had
repercussions long after the war
ended. The conduct of monetary poli-
cy in the Civil War is not simply of
interest to historians. The era also pro-
vides important lessons for monetary
policymakers and researchers. The
experience of the Confederacy in par-
ticular illustrates the consequences of
poor financial infrastructure and gov-
ernance. It also shows the power of a
generally monetarist explanation of
inflation.
At the start of the war, the
Confederacy faced many daunting 
barriers to the conduct of sound mon-
etary policy. Perhaps most important
of these was the decentralized power
structure of the Confederate govern-
ment. The Southern states had
seceded under the banner of states’
rights and were reluctant to obey the
economic policies of President
Jefferson Davis or Secretary of the
Treasury Christopher Memminger.
The South also lacked a well-devel-
oped financial infrastructure since in
the antebellum period most large
banking operations were in the North,
where most of the gold was held. 
Each state could charter banks, and
there was considerable heterogeneity
in banking and regulatory practices
across the Southern states. Since each
bank could issue its own currency
notes, the government had limited
ability to conduct coordinated mone-
tary policy. Further, the absence of a
central bank to act as a lender of last
resort made the banking industry
prone to liquidity crises. The only
source for centralized economic policy
was the Confederate Treasury under
Memminger, but this office was sub-
ject to the vagaries of the executive
and legislative branches of govern-
ment, meaning that policy could be
influenced for political, not economic,
reasons as argued by economist
Eugene Lerner. 
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omy also impeded effective monetary
policy. Heavily dependent on agricul-
ture, the South had little industrial
capital and few liquid assets. The lack
of liquidity made tax collection in the
rural South very hard, while the lack of
economic diversification made the
economy prone to adverse shocks in
its few export goods such as cotton.
Finally, the South had a relatively 
uneducated population which led to
constant worker shortages in the
Treasury’s office in Richmond and in
other posts requiring a high degree of
literacy.
The combination of these structural
problems coupled with shortsighted
policymaking by the Confederate
Congress meant that taxation and bor-
rowing ultimately failed to raise
sufficient funds to conduct the war. So
the Confederacy had to finance itself
through the excessive printing of
money, which led to hyperinflation.
Increased taxation, the most direct
and obvious way of raising additional
revenue, failed to finance a significant
portion of the war for the
Confederacy. Only 8 percent to 11 per-
cent of all wartime revenue in the
South came from taxation, despite the
introduction of many new taxes on
income, professional licenses, and
property. In addition, a new excise tax
on cotton, the most significant export
crop in the South, also failed due to
the surprisingly effective naval block-
ade orchestrated by the Union.
Prior to the Civil War, the Southern
states enjoyed one of the lightest tax
burdens in the world; when the war
started there was thus no infrastruc-
ture in place to efficiently levy and
collect taxes except for duties on
imports and exports at major ports.
Many state governments were very
hostile to collection efforts by the
Confederate government and actively
aided their citizens in tax evasion as
documented by Lerner in his classic
study of Confederate economic policy.
For instance, only South Carolina paid
for the Tax of 1861 by collecting duties
from its citizens; the other states sim-
ply took out loans to pay their share. 
As more and more tax bills were
passed, the tax code became increas-
ingly complicated, further hindering
collection efforts. Indeed, the only
taxes that could reliably raise revenue
were taxes-in-kind, which meant that
goods were confiscated directly. But
Lerner argues that this practice ulti-
mately led to a decline in market
activity, as farmers began to produce
only enough to support themselves,
fearful that their surplus crop would
be captured by taxation agents.
Jefferson Davis and Secretary
Memminger were also stymied in their
attempts to raise revenue through bor-
rowing. Though their initial bond
offering of 50 million Confederate
dollars sold well, subsequent issues did
not sell well except in some foreign
markets. One problem with these later
bond issues was timing — the war
started in April just as farmers were
planting and strapped for cash. Also,
the 6 percent to 8 percent coupons
paid by most of these bonds were
more than eaten up by high inflation. 
Throughout the entire course of the
war, the South managed to secure only
one overseas loan, from Erlanger &
Co. in Paris. The loan had a face value
of $15 million and was issued at a time
when things looked bright for the
South, on the eve of the battles of
Vicksburg and Gettysburg. The
Confederacy’s defeats at these two
pivotal battles caused the value of the
loan to plummet so that after commis-
sion, Erlanger likely netted the South
only $3 million in real terms, not
enough to make much of a difference
to the war effort.
With no other avenue open,
Secretary Memminger reluctantly
turned to the printing press to meet
the Confederacy’s financing needs.
Memminger was aware that such a
move would likely cause a rise in the
price level and warned the government
repeatedly about this danger, to no
avail. The Treasury bills issued during
the war had a peculiar feature: They
were redeemable for gold two years
after the war ended, which meant that
the value of the bills was partially tied
to expectations of victory for the
Confederacy. So rapid was the expan-
sion of the Confederate money supply
that at one point during the war, the
orders for new currency exceeded the
printing capacity of the Treasury’s
presses. To fill the order, the Treasury
began to accept counterfeit currency
as valid to further expand the supply of
money.
The enormous increase in the quan-
tity of currency precipitated an era of
hyperinflation in the Confederacy as
more dollars chased fewer goods. The
price level in the South rose by rough-
ly 10 percent per month during the
conflict and by the end of the war, the
price level had increased in the
Confederacy by a factor of 92, though
imports tended to inflate more quick-
ly and exports more slowly. At the
same time, the blockade, military
destruction, and the loss of workers to
the war caused real wages and output
to fall dramatically, with per-capita
consumption falling by 50 percent in
real terms. Indeed, if banks had not
sharply increased their reserve ratios
for fear of bank runs, the inflation cre-
ated by excess money in the South
would likely have been even more
severe.
Hyperinflation had a number of
negative effects on the Southern
wartime economy. As currency
became useless as a store of value, the
rate at which people spent their cash
reserves — the velocity of money —
increased, driving prices still higher.
In many areas of the South,
Confederate dollars became worth-
less unless accompanied by some
valuable underlying commodity such
as cotton or leather, impeding the
smooth economic exchanges on
which healthy economies depend. In
border areas, the Union greenback
currency became the preferred medi-
um for exchange due to its superior
stability. Faced with the danger of
imminent invasion and the burden of
supporting and hosting the military,
the border areas tended to be partic-
ularly harmed by the war.
The Confederate government
passed the Currency Reform Act of
1864 in an effort to stem the rampant
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effectively removed one-third of all
currency in the South from circula-
tion by mandating that all large
denomination bills be converted to 
4 percent Treasury bonds before
April 1, 1864, and imposing a 3-to-2
redemption ratio for small bills after
the deadline. As people tried to get
rid of their large notes, velocity
spiked and in the months prior to the
deadline, inflation rose to 23 percent
a month. In the summer of 1864,
though, price levels in the
Confederacy finally stabilized and
even declined slightly, just as mone-
tary theory would predict following a
contraction in the money supply.
However, in the face of continuing
pressure to meet war obligations,
Congress authorized the printing of
an additional $275 million in August
of 1864, mostly reversing the effects
of the Currency Reform Act. 
In contrast with the South, the
Union successfully raised the $2.3
billion necessary to fund its war
effort without causing hyperinfla-
tion. Though inflation was high in
the North during the war — prices
doubled in most Northern cities — it
paled in comparison to the hyperin-
flation that plagued the Confederacy.
The North drastically changed its
tax collection system and financial
infrastructure to accommodate the
burdens of a long, expensive war.
These wartime changes ultimate-
ly helped reshape the economic
face of America.
Whereas the South was mostly
unable to raise funds through loans,
the North financed roughly 65 per-
cent of its war effort through
borrowing. Wealthy Philadelphia
financier Jay Cooke successfully
orchestrated the sale of huge num-
bers of war bonds. In order to sell
these issues, Cooke launched a
massive advertising campaign
aimed at middle- and working-class
families who traditionally were not
seen as a major source of funds. His
campaign was a success, with
almost 1 million working families
purchasing war bonds. This adver-
tising effort presaged the modern era
in which bond issues to the general
public were used to help pay for wars.
During the war, the Union also man-
aged to expand its tax base and revamp
its collection system. After some ini-
tial tax measures in 1861, including the
first federal income tax in U.S. history,
the Union passed the Internal
Revenue Act of 1862 which raised the
income tax, enacted luxury and con-
sumption taxes, and created the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. In con-
trast to the Confederate bureaucracy
where central control was weak and
administrative capability lacking, the
Bureau of Internal Revenue stream-
lined federal tax collection, a process
so effective that the North raised 20
percent of its wartime revenue
through taxation.
The Union Congress also passed
several important pieces of financial
legislation during the Civil War. In
1861, the financial demands of the war
began to deplete the gold reserves of
both the banking sector and the
Treasury. In response, private banks
ceased redeeming currency for gold,
and soon the Treasury followed suit.
The government passed the Legal
Tender Act of 1862, which allowed the
issuance of legal tender currency not
backed by gold. This marked the first
time in U.S. history that a fiat curren-
cy, or a currency not backed by some
underlying commodity, was used as
legal tender. A year later the Union
government passed the National
Banking Act of 1863 which created a
system of nationally chartered and reg-
ulated banks to ensure a market for
Union war bonds. Preexisting banks
were given very strong incentives to
become nationally chartered. Once
chartered they were subject to federal
reserve requirements, had to accept all
other national banks’ currencies at
face value, and had to hold federal
bonds as collateral against note issue. 
Both the Legal Tender Act and the
National Banking Act were intended
to be temporary measures to meet the
exigencies of war. However, both sets
of reforms lasted long after the con-
flict ended. More broadly, these acts,
coupled with the expansion of taxa-
tion and the creation of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, marked an impor-
tant shift in the power of the U.S.
government. After the Civil War, the
federal government had much more
control over banking regulation and
monetary policy, and much more
power over the states generally. 
In hindsight it is easy to point out
where the South went wrong and what
the government could have done bet-
ter. However, at the time the situation
was much less clear to government
officials. Politicians and generals on
both sides of the conflict began the
war with extremely optimistic
assessments of its outcome and
duration. Southern confidence in
a quick victory, coupled with a
political climate that distrusted
taxation and centralized authority,
meant that short-term expedients
were repeatedly selected as 
fiscal problems arose. Had the
Confederates known that the war
would take years instead of
months, they may well have seri-
ously attempted to overhaul their
banking and tax collection sys-
tems instead of relying so heavily
on the printing press.
One major reason the South was
reluctant to reform its financial
system was the faith its leaders and
citizens placed in the ability of
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Money Supply and Inflation 
in the Confederacy
As the South increased its money supply during the
first three years of the war, inflation followed. Later,
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side of the war for them. The South
had planned to use the good to finance
the war and to induce Great Britain,
heavily dependent on cotton for its
textile mills, to grant the Confederacy
diplomatic recognition. The effective-
ness of the Union blockade prevented
the South from realizing either of
these goals.
The Confederate experience lends
considerable support to the thesis
that inflation is largely a function of
the growth in the supply of money.
Economists Richard Burdekin and
Marc Weidenmier of Claremont
McKenna College have taken advan-
tage of a geographic peculiarity after
the 1864 Currency Reform Act to fur-
ther examine this relationship. The
act removed one-third of the currency
in circulation once it went into effect.
However, by this time the South had
lost the battle for Vicksburg, and with
it the Mississippi River, thus isolating
the eastern and western halves of the
Confederacy. After the Currency
Reform Act went into effect in
Richmond, inflation slowed and even
reversed for a short time as the cur-
rency stock decreased. Yet in
Houston, the major Confederate
financial center in the West, inflation
continued virtually unabated since
transportation difficulties severely
muted the effect of the currency
reform. 
Given that by mid-1864 the military
situation had begun to look rather
grim for the Confederacy, it is partic-
ularly notable that the price level fell
in Richmond. As Sherman and Grant
steadily fought their way into the
Confederacy, expectations of a
Southern victory must have fallen.
People should then have become
more eager to spend Southern notes
(trading a potentially worthless cur-
rency for real goods), thereby raising
inflation by increasing velocity. Even
with the external military threat
looming ever larger, a reduction in the
currency stock halted and then
reversed inflation. 
However, it should be noted that
following the fall of Atlanta in
September 1864, inflation grew very
rapidly despite relatively stable
growth in the money supply. It had
become clear that the Confederacy
was on the verge of collapse, so
Southerners wanted to spend their
currency while it still had some value.
In April 1865, Robert E. Lee and his
Army of Northern Virginia surren-
dered at Appomattox, effectively
ending the war.
In many ways, the Civil War was a
watershed in U.S. history. It brought a
sudden end to slavery in the South,
and wrought tremendous destruction
in the South and border states. The
war was also extremely expensive, and
the enormous and unprecedented
expenditures severely strained the
financial systems of both govern-
ments, spurring innovation and
centralization in one and monetary
suicide in the other. The wartime
finance policies of the North set the
stage for much more modern currency
and banking systems. At the same
time, the defeated Confederacy
showed the dangers of excessive
money creation. Shortsightedness,
political resistance to taxation, and a
lack of liquidity led the South down
the disastrous path of the printing
press. The Southern experience should
serve as a cautionary tale to policy-
makers about the dangers of bad
financial institutions and rampant
money creation.  RF
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The vignette in the center of this 1862-
issued $5 Confederate note shows the 
Capitol building in Richmond. 
The portrait on the right is of Secretary 
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